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EVIDENCE
CHARLES H. RANDALL, JR.*
Relevancy
Meaning of Relevancy - Manner of Objecting. In Elliott
v. Black River Electric Cooperative,' an action for the alleged
wrongful death of a farmer killed by a discharge of elec-
tricity from a high voltage uninsulated wire of defendant's
power line passing over his farm, plaintiff offered in evi-
dence a photograph of the deceased taken shortly before his
death. Defense counsel objected, saying, "I don't see the
relevancy of that." Plaintiff's counsel replied, "It shows the
condition of his health. They can judge that from the photo-
graph, your Honor.' 2 On appeal, defendant argued that the
photo should have been excluded as prejudicial and inflam-
matory.
The offer was clearly logically relevant on the issue of dam-
ages to show the condition of decedent's health shortly before
his unfortunate death. The foundation laid for receiving the
photo appears likewise clearly adequate. It would also seem
that the prejudicial effect of the photo was slight compared
to the probative value thereof, and that therefore the trial
judge in his discretion could properly admit the photo. The
Supreme Court did not reach this consideration, however,
holding in an opinion by Mr. Justice Legge that the objection
was lacking in sufficient specificity to raise any question
other than logical relevancy. This accords with the defi-
nition of relevancy in the Uniform Rules of Evidence;8
however, the key provision of the Rules, a provision which
merely restates the better common law cases on the sub-
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 233 S. C. 233, 104 S. E. 2d 357 (1958).
2. 233 S. C. 258, 104 S. E. 2d 370 (1958).
3. The Uniform Rules have not been as yet adopted in any jurisdic-
tion, although Utah and New Jersey are well advanced in consideration
of proposals for adoption. Relevancy is defined in Rule 1, Definitions,
"(2) 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency in reason
to prove a material fact." In the instant case the evidence was probative
of the issue of damages.
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ject, is Rule 45,4 which provides that relevancy is always
to be balanced against the counter-factors of undue consump-
tion of time, confusion of the jury, prejudice and unfair sur-
prise. Judges and lawyers should automatically consider these
counter-factors to admission when a question of relevancy
is posed. It is difficult to see what defense counsel was ob-
jecting to here, other than that admission of the photo would
be prejudicial. The general objection is usually inadequate,
but an exception obtains where the ground for the objection
is obvious.5 Perhaps a sounder ground for decision in the
instant case would be that suggested above: that the photo
was of slight prejudicial value, and admissible in the trial
court's discretion.
Similar transactions and events. South Carolina State High-
way Dept. v. Hines6 was a de novo appeal from an award of
the condemnation board compensating the owners of a filling
station site for the taking of a fifteen feet wide frontage strip
of the property. The trial court excluded evidence of the
owner that he had received an offer from the landowner of
adjoining property on the rear to sell an equivalent strip for
$5,000. The Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Legge, approved
this ruling, saying that the evidence of the offer was "clearly
inadmissible." Justice Legge based his conclusion, which is
clearly dicta, on Sharpe v. United States :7
.... The liberal attitude of the courts toward admission
of evidence tending to show the fair value of the prop-
erty taken permits competent evidence of the fair value,
at or near the time of the taking, of land similar to and
near that taken, and, as evidence of such value, the price
realized from voluntary sales of similar land in the vicin-
ity within a reasonable time. 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain
§ 273; Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain (1936
Ed.), Par. 135; United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, 4
4. Rule 45 provides: Rule 45. Discretion of Judge to Exclude Admis-
sible Evidence. Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge
may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create substantial danger
of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury,
or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who had not had reason-
able opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
5. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 118 (1954). On p. 119, Professor McCor-
mick argues that objection on the ground of irrelevancy should raise
the question of prejudice.
6. 234 S. C. 254, 107 S. E. 2d 643 (1959).
7. 191 U. S. 341 (1903).
[Vol. 12
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol12/iss1/8
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
Cir., 200 F. 2d 659. But testimony of the condemnee
as to a price at which adjacent or nearby property
has been offered for sale to him is manifestly inadmissi-
ble, especially where such offer has not been accepted.
As was said in Sharpe v. United States, 191 U. S. 341,
24 S. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211, quoted with approval in
Baynham v. State Highway Department of S. C., 181
S. C. 435, 187 S. E. 528, 534:
'Oral and not binding offers are so easily made and
refused in a mere passing conversation, and under cir-
cumstances involving no responsibility on either side,
as to cast no light upon the question of value. It is fre-
quently very difficult to show precisely the situation
under which these offers were made. In our judgment
they do not tend to show value, and they are unsatisfac-
tory, easy of fabrication, and even dangerous in their
character as evidence upon this subject. Especially is
this the case when the offers are proved only by the
party to whom they are alleged to have been made, and
not by the party making them. There is no chance to
cross-examine as to the circumstances of the party mak-
ing the offer in regard to good faith, etc .....
The Court held however that the trial judge had correctly
applied this rule and had excluded the evidence, permitting
only respondent's testimony as to his opinion of the value.
Shepherd v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company
8
involved a closer question under this heading. Defendant
company's car, parked in the driveway at the home of one
of defendant's employees, also a defendant, who was using
it with the company's permission, rolled down the driveway
at night and hit plaintiff's car driving past the employee's
house. The defense offered the employee's neighbor, who
lived two houses away, as a witness to testify that the latter's
car had been tampered with on other occasions while in its
driveway. The purpose of this line of questioning would be,
of course, to establish an alternative hypothesis to negligence,
to account for the car's rolling down the driveway where
little direct evidence was available. The trial court refused
to permit this line of questioning. In affirming, the Supreme
Court, per Chief Justice Stukes, said :9
8. 233 S. C. 536, 106 S. E. 2d 381 (1958).
9. 233 S. C. 544, 106 S. E. 2d 384 (1958).
1959]
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.... Answer to the question was properly excluded. It
did not relate to the premises of the Halls [defendant
employee of defendant company] or to the night in
question and was, therefore, irrelevant. Green v. Sparks,
232 S. C. 414, 432, 102 S. E. 2d 435.
A more difficult question would be raised had the trial judge
admitted the evidence. Chief Justice Stukes' language above
suggests that he would favor a flat rule of exclusion in such
a situation, but surely here as in all relevancy questions con-
siderable discretion must reside in the trial court. The evi-
dence is not logically irrelevant but is of slight circumstantial
weight. It opens up collateral inquiries and possible undue
consumption of time. Perhaps had the trial judge admitted
the evidence that ruling should likewise be upheld on appeal.' 0
Ward v. Liberty Life Insurance Company" was an action
for damages for fraudulent breach of an alleged under-
taking by defendants, a life insurance company and a savings
and loan association, to procure and put in force a policy
of insurance on the life of plaintiff's intestate. The policy
in question was a term policy covering the term of a home
mortgage loan to plaintiff and her husband. The policy was
not to take effect until the first premium was paid. Plain-
tiff's intestate died before the first premium payment was
made by the savings and loan association.
Plaintiff's theory was that the loan association officer, also
an agent of the defendant insurance company, who received
the insurance application should have paid the premium from
funds held in an escrow account. Plaintiff offered a witness,
an officer of another savings and loan association, to testify
to the custom of that organization in making payments of
premiums under insurance undertakings containing identical
provisions, on policies of the same insurance company. The
witness testified, however, that he did not know whether
associations other than his own handled such transactions
in the same manner. The trial court excluded this testimony,
the Supreme Court affirming on the ground that the evidence
was res inter alios acta. This expression usually serves more
to stifle than to aid thought,12 but in the instant case the
ruling was obviously within the sound discretion of the trial
court.
10. mcCoRyICK, supra, note 5 at 351.
11. 232 S. C. 582, 103 S. E. 2d 48 (1958).
12. MCCORMICK, supra, note 5 at 346.
[Vol. 12
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Waltz v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U. S. 13 in-
volved a similar ruling, the Supreme Court upholding the
trial judge's exclusion of evidence concerning action of the
parties under a group life policy, where in issue in the case
was an accidental death policy containing different terms.
Demonstration by Personal Injury Claimant. In Green 'V.
Boney,1 4 during the testimony of plaintiff's doctor to the
effect that plaintiff had permanent disability and "some de-
gree of limp", plaintiff's counsel requested that his client be
permitted to walk before the jury so as to obtain the physi-
cian's opinion as to whether the injury caused the limp. The
trial court ruled that he would not permit this until plaintiff
had been sworn. Later when plaintiff was testifying he was
permitted to walk before the jury. The Supreme Court, per
Mr. Justice Oxner, held that this was within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court. The authorities axe in general
agreement that such simple demonstrations are permissible,15
although some courts stress the possibility of exaggeration
and differentiate between active and passive demonstrations,
permitting only the latter.1
Photographs. A photograph of the scene of an accident,
intended to depict visibility conditions at the time of the acci-
dent, was excluded in Peagler v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company.1 Grounds for the exclusion were that the circum-
stances at the time of the taking were not identical in im-
portant respects to those at the time of the accident, and
that the photograph was merely cumulative. On the former
point, the trial judge said :'8
... I examined the picture again carefully during the
argument for the new trial, and I advised counsel for
the Defendants that I desired it to be clearly set forth
in the record that my reasons for excluding the picture
was that it did not appear to clearly and substantially
represent the conditions at the time of the injury to the
Plaintiff, and the proper foundation had not been laid
as to similarity of conditions, and that the lights in
13. 233 S. C. 210, 104 S. E. 2d 384 (1958).
14. 233 S. C. 49, 103 S. E. 2d 732 (1958).
15. McCORMICK, supra, note 5 at 346-7. Justice Oxner cites O'Keefe
v. Ripp, 110 N. J. L. 555, 166 A. 197 (1933), Annot., 103 A. L. R. 1335
(1936); 20 Am. Jun., Evidence, § 724 (1940).
16. Willis v. City of Browning, 161 Mo. App. 461, 143 S. W. 516
(1912).
17. 234 S. C. 140, 107 S. E. 2d 15 (1959).,18. 234 S. C. 140, 107 S. E. 2d 27 (1959)..
1959]
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the rear in the upper section of the picture appeared
more like a Christmas tree or the lighted windows of a
passenger car, and counsel for Defendants admitted that
there was no lighted passenger car present at the time of
the injury....
The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling as being a sound
exercise of the discretion of the trial judge, Mr. Justice Moss
saying: 19
We have carefully considered the record in this case
and we conclude as did the trial Judge, that it was proper
to exclude the proffered photograph for the reason that
there were no facts in the evidence to support what the
picture attempted to portray. The conditions under which
the photograph was taken differed from those in dis-
pute.
Opinion Evidence
Non-Expert Testimony - Value of Land. In South Caro-
lina State Highway Department v. Hines, supra,20 plaintiff,
a civil engineer, had for many years been a general contractor
and had been buying and selling real estate for some years,
although he did not consider himself a "real estate man".
He was permitted to give his opinion as to the value of a
fifteen foot strip of property adjoining the back of his land,
which strip he had been interested in obtaining to offset the
loss of a similar strip of his frontage taken by the city. The
Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of this opinion evi-
dence, apparently on the ground that the subject was one that
permitted non-expert testimony, Mr. Justice Legge saying:21
.... No peculiar ability or specialized training is re-
quired to enable a witness to testify as to his opinion
of the value of property with which he is acquainted.
Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain (1936 Ed.),
Par. 130. Decision as to his competency in such a matter
rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge, the
extent of his experience going not so much to his com-
petency as to the weight of his testimony. As Judge
Parker said in United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land,
4 Cir., 172 F. 2d 990, 995: "Artificial rules of evidence
19. 234 S. C. 140,107 S. E. 2d 28 (1959).
20. 234 S. C. 254, 107 S. E. 2d 643 (1959).
21. 284 S. C. 24, 107 S. E. 2d 645 (1959).
[Vol. 12
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which exclude from the consideration of the jurors mat-
ters which men consider in their everyday affairs hinder
rather than help them at arriving at a just result. In
no branch of the law is it more important to remember
this, than in cases involving the valuation of property,
where 'at best, evidence of value is largely a matter of
opinion'. See Montana R. Co. v. Warren, 137 U. S. 34-8,
352, 11 S. Ct. 96, 97, 34 L. Ed. 681." We find no error
in the admission of this testimony.
This is a sound, common-sense approach to the problem. Fur-
ther support for the ruling might be found in the position
that, if expert testimony is deemed a requisite here, the wit-
ness was sufficiently qualified as an expert.22
Collective-Facts Rule. In Jenkins v. E. L. Long Motor
Lines,23 involving a collision of an automobile with wrecked
tractor-trailer unit, one issue was whether the defendant's
tractor-trailer had been speeding before it wrecked. To show
such excess speed, plaintiff testified that the trailer had slid
along the ground after turning over. Defendant offered a
witness who had repaired numerous wrecks of trailers and
had observed the wrecked trailer involved in the instant case.
The witness was asked whether, judging from the marks on
the left side of this trailer, he had an opinion whether the
trailer had slid for any considerable distance. The trial judge
permitted the witness to testify as to the marks on the trailer,
but did not permit an opinion as to skidding. The Supreme
Court affirmed this ruling in an opinion by Mr. Justice Tay-
lor, stating that the witness did not qualify as an expert
on abrasives, and that the subject, being within the range
of ordinary experience, was not one for expert testimony
anyway. Assuming the correctness of this analysis, the fur-
ther question should be raised whether this witness might
not state his impressions in opinion form as a non-expert.
The witness did actually view the damaged trailer and thus
had personal observation to relate to the jury. The witness
should not be inhibited from saying that the trailer looked
like it had skidded, or had not skidded, if this method of
statement would add factual content to his testimony.2 4 This
22. A recent leading case containing an excellent discussion of the
requirements for expert testimony is Bratt v. Western Air Lines, 155
F. 2d 850 (10th Cir. 1946).
23. 233 S. C. 87, 103 S. E. 2d 523 (1958).
24. See McCoRMICK, supra, note 5 at 21, cases cited in Note 13, 14
p. 23.
1959]
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is of course the familiar "collective facts" rule. Apparently
this possibility was not suggested to either the trial court or
the Supreme Court.
Best Evidence Rule
The most difficult thing for lawyers and judges to remem-
ber about the best evidence rule is that there is no such rule.
2 5
There is no rule known to the common law which requires
the exclusion of any evidence other than the best available
proof of the fact sought to be established. 26 There is of course
an important rule imprecisely called the "best evidence" rule
but better denominated the "preferred documents" rule. This
rule provides that in proving the terms of a writing, where
such terms are material, the original writing only is admis-
sible unless its absence is satisfactorily explained. If the
absence of the original is satisfactorily explained, a copy is
then admissible.
In two cases this year, the Supreme Court purported to
apply the best evidence rule. Perhaps in neither case was the
result wrong, but language in the opinions may return to
haunt later cases. In Want v. Best Company,27 the court pur-
ported to apply the rule to an offer of an original document,
a letter, written by one of two co-executors. The letter was
offered as a vicarious admission against the other co-executor,
and was excluded as hearsay. The letter stated that the lat-
ter co-executor had taken a considerable sum of cash belong-
ing to the estate "down to Darlington with him in a brief
case." The letter was rejected as hearsay. It was argued
that the letter should be received under the hearsay exception
for vicarious admissions because of privity between the two
co-executors. Rejecting this argument, Mr. Justice Legge
said :23
.... We need to explore that theory, in its relation to
the case in hand, no further than to say that 'in our
judgment the competency of such vicarious admissions
25. McCoRMIcx, supra, note 5 at 408.
26. Nor, as Professor Maguire pointed out, is there any rule to the
effect that the best evidence available on a particular issue is ad-
missible. See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, Common Sense and Common Law, 31
(1947). Cases are legion in which the only evidence offered to prove a
particular fact in issue was incompetent, such as hearsay evidence, and
the proponent's case therefore failed.
27. 233 S. C. 460, 105, S. E. 2d 678 (1958).
28. 233 S. C. 488, 105 8. E. 2d 692 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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should be tested by the fundamental rule that requires
the evidence offered to be the best available proof of
the fact sought to be established. The exhibit in ques-
tion fails to meet that test.
It is apparent that this is not an application of the "best
evidence" rule. The proper ground for the decision is that
the admission exception to the hearsay rule is inapplicable
to a declaration by one co-executor against another.2 9
In Peagler v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company,30 Mr.
Justice Taylor writing for the Court upheld the trial court's
exclusion of certain hospital records on the ground that they
were merely cumulative, since physicians who had treated
the particular patient (the plaintiff) had given their per-
sonal testimony using the records to refresh their recollec-
tion. The learned Justice then added two further 'grounds
for exclusion, one based on hearsay-opinion considerations, 31
the other on the best evidence rule. On the latter point the
opinion says :32
We conclude that even though the proffered documents
of the hospital records of the respondent in form com-
plied with section 26-101 of the 1952 Code of Laws of
South Carolina, their admission in the evidence would
clearly have been a violation of the best evidence rule.
We think the trial Judge committed no error in exclud-
ing the hospital records from the evidence.
Other parts of the opinion indicate that not only were certi-
fied copies of these hospital records offered, to be filed in
the case, but the originals were offered in evidence as well.
If the original documents are offered in evidence, the best
evidence rule has no application. If the originals are re-
quired to be kept on file in a public office, the purpose of
the cited statute is to make the offer in evidence of certified
copies a sufficient compliance with the best evidence rule.
Otherwise the cited statute would seem to have no meaning
at all.
29. McCORmIcK, supra, note 5 at 524, f. n. 3, 4, 5.
30. Peagler v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., supra, note 17.
31. Discussed below under Hearsay.
32. 234 S. C. 140, 107 S. E. 2d 32 (1959). Perhaps, in context, this
statement of Mr. Justice Taylor is only his summary of the preceding
paragraph. See discussion infra under Hearsay.
19593
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Cross-Examination
Foundation for Impeachment. In the Black River Electrical
Cooperative case,88 a witness who could not read or write,
except to sign his name, denied on cross-examination having
signed a particular written statement. Cross-examining coun-
sel presented the statement to him and asked, for the pur-
pose of laying a foundation for impeachment, whether he
had not made the statement to one Irvin. Later in the trial,
the next day, counsel offered as a witness to impeach the
principal witness above, one Morris rather than Irvin, offer-
ing to show that the original witness made the statement to
Morris. The trial court refused to permit impeachment of
the witness by the testimony of Morris. In affirming this
ruling, Mr. Justice Legge said:34
.... The purpose of the preliminary questioning of the
witness is to adequately apprise him of the particular
circumstances in which and the occasion on which it is
claimed that he made the former statement, so that he
may be prepared to disprove it or explain it away, State
v. Hampton, 79 S. C. 179, 60 S. E. 669. The question
of whether or not the witness has been thus adequately
warned of the contemplated impeachment of his testi-
mony is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge,
Jones on Evidence, 4th Ed., Vol. 3, Section 844; and his
decision as to the extent of the preliminary cross exam-
ination and as to the allowance of contradictory testi-
mony will not be disturbed on appeal except for manifest
abuse of that discretion.
Except for the fact that the prior inconsistent statement was
written by another person and was signed by the otherwise
illiterate witness, this is a typical application of the rule re-
quiring that a foundation be laid before such impeaching testi-
mony is permitted.
3 5
Opening Line of Inquiry. In Hansson v. General Insulation
and Acoustics 36 defendant introduced in evidence a letter
which contained a post-script not related directly to the body
of the letter. On cross-examination, plaintiff's counsel ques-
tioned concerning the post-script, to attempt to show that
33. Elliott v. Black River Electric Cooperative, supra, note 1.
34. 233 S. C. 261, 104 S. E. 2d 372 (1958).
35. McCoRImic, supra, note 5 at 67.
36. 234 S. C. 177, 107 S. E. 2d 41 (1959').
[-Vol. 12
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defendant's officer was a litigious person. Over objection the
trial court permitted this questioning. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the trial court in its discretion could
permit this questioning, since defendant had introduced the
letter.
Hearsay
Conduct as Hearsay. In the Ward case,3 7 Mrs. Ward on the
witness stand was asked whether Mr. Ward, the deceased,
had gone to nearby Greer to pay his bills on the day he was
taken ill. The offer of proof was intended to develop that he
had gone to Greer, and had paid his bills, and that since he
had not paid the insurance premium on that visit, a per-
missible inference was that he had not received notice that
the premium was due. The trial court on objection excluded
this evidence as irrelevant, "a little far afield". This would
appear a correct analysis of the problem; the circumstantial
evidence is of weak probative force, if any, and the trial
judge's ruling in excluding it was within his sound discretion.
It has been suggested that such an offer of evidence also had
characteristics of a declaration through conduct, and hence
can be analyzed as hearsay. The Uniform Rules of Evidence38
classify this kind of evidence as hearsay only where the actor
intended the non-verbal conduct as a substitute for words.
In the instant case no such intent appears, and analysis in
terms of circumstantial evidence rather than of hearsay ap-
pears sound. 39
Admissions. In Green v. Boney,40 on the issue of negligence,
the trial court admitted in evidence defendant's plea of guilty
in a criminal proceeding in -which he had been indicted for
involuntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court, per Mr. Jus-
tice Oxner, affirmed on the ground that this constituted an
admission, and pointed out that defendant had full oppor-
tunity to explain his previous plea. Defendant's argument
against admissibility rested on the fact that he had been
jointly indicted with the plaintiff herein for causing the death
37. Ward v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., supra, note 11.
38. Rule 62 (1): "'Statement' means not only an oral or written ex-
pression but also non-verbal conduct of a person intended by him as a
substitute for words in expressing the matter stated."
39. The problem is lucidly discussed in McCORMICK, The Borderland
of Hearsay, 39 YALn L. J. 489 (1930) and FALKNOR, Silence as Hearsay,
89 U. PA. L. REV. 192 (1940).
40. Green v. Boney, supra, note 14.
1959]
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of a passenger in plaintiff's car. Rejecting this fact as a
basis for distinguishing cases on admissions arising from
pleas of guilty, Mr. Justice Oxner said :41
... Counsel for defendant state that it was only an ad-
mission that defendant and plaintiff by their joint negli-
gence injured Buggs and argue that the general rule
does not apply where there is a joint indictment. We find
no basis for the claimed distinction. In order to render
a defendant criminally liable, it is not necessary for the
State to show that his negligence was the sole cause of
injury or death. It is sufficient if it contributed as a
proximate cause.
The admission exception to the hearsay rule as it arose in the
Want case4 2 has been briefly noted above.
Hearsay-Opinion; Hospital Records. South Carolina has no
business entries or hospital records statute, nor does the
Supreme Court appear sympathetic to judicial broadening of
the rules for admissibility of such documents, as some courts
have done. In the Peagler case,43 appellants offered certified
copies of certain records concerning the plaintiff-respondent
while he was a patient in United States Navy and Veterans'
Administration hospitals. Only two days before the accident
in which he ran into a railway flat-car at night, plaintiff had
been released from the hospital. The hospital records showed
a long history of diagnosis of the plaintiff as a neuro-psy-
chotic and treatment of him for delirium tremens. Appellant
called as witnesses some of the doctors who had made the
diagnosis, and wanted to offer the hospital records as well
to corroborate their testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed
the ruling excluding the records on the ground they were
merely cumulative. The opinion then adds :44
The hospital records excluded by the trial Judge were
made by many physicians and other employees in said
hospitals. Dr. Paulsen referred to these records as 'a
narrative summary'. They contain records of the history
of the patient made pursuant to investigation and in-
quiries from the various staff officials of the hospitals
and from members of the family of the respondent. These
41. 233 S. C. 61, 103 S. E. 2d 738 (1958).
42. Want v. Alfred M. Best Co., supra, note 27.
43. Peagler v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., supra, note 17.
44. 234 S. C. 140, 107 S. E. 2d 32 (1959).
[Vol. 12
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records likewise contain many expressions of opinion
and conclusions concerning causes and effects, which in-
volved the exercise of judgment and discretion. We think
the records were inadmissible in evidence.
In the case of State v. Pearson, 223 S. C. 377, 76 S. E.
2d 151, and in the case of Griggs v. Driggers, 230 S. C.
97, 94 S. E. 2d 225, this Court quoted with approval from
the case of Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405,
140 N. E. 465, 469, 29 A. L. R., 281, the following:
'The principle which seems fairly deducible from them
is that a record of a primary fact made by a public officer
in the performance of official duty is or may be made
by legislation competent prima facie evidence as to the
existence of that fact, but that records of investigations
and inquiries conducted, either voluntarily or pursuant
to requirement of law, by public officers concerning
causes and effects and involving the exercise of judg-
ment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making
conclusions are not admissible as evidence as public rec-
ords.'
We conclude that even though the proffered docu-
ments of the hospital records of the respondent in form
complied with section 26-101 of the 1952 Code of Laws of
South Carolina, their admission in the evidence would
clearly have been a violation of the best evidence rule.
We think the trial Judge committed no error in excluding
the hospital records from the evidence.
The problem of admissibility of such documents is a confusing
one, and involved consideration of several rules of evidence.
First, the offered records must be authenticated. This re-
quires their being identified by a witness who can testify to
what they are. Of course no problem of authentication is
involved in the instant case, since the doctor who made the
records testified at the trial, and can identify the records.
Second, consideration should be given to the applicability of
the so-called "best evidence" rule. M~r. Justice Taylor's state-
ment to the contrary notwithstanding, it is clear that no best
evidence problem is involved in the instant case, since the
original documents are offered in evidence. Third, the state-
ments in the record are offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated, and therefore are hearsay. This is the real
problem as regards the competency of the evidence. In regard
to a particular offered document, problems of multiple hear-
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say may arise.45 The question to which Mr. Justice Taylor's
remarks above are properly addressed, therefore, is whether,
the matter being hearsay, any exception, common law or stat-
utory, to the hearsay rule would permit their admission. This
was the problem in Commonwealth v. Slavski, cited by Mr.
Justice Taylor, in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts upheld as constitutional a Commonwealth statute
which authorized introduction in evidence of a certificate by
the department of health containing an analysis of composi-
tion and quality of liquors made by the department. The dis-
tinguished Chief Justice Rugg in the Slavski case drew an
analogy between the statute and the official statements ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, and rejected defendant's assertion
that the statute violated his constitutional right to confront
witnesses against him. The quotation from the Siavski opin-
ion in Mr. Justice Taylor's opinion in the instant case is an
attempt to summarize the cases involving the official state-
ments exception to the hearsay rule. This statement and
cases from other jurisdictions support Mr. Justice Taylor's
refusal to broaden the official statements exception to in-
clude statements of hearsay or inference. Counsel in the
instant case argued admissibility under this exception to the
hearsay rule. 6 Professor McCormick has argued with per-
suasive power for a more liberal attitude toward admissi-
bility of such medical records, particularly in jurisdictions
which have a modern business entries statute.4t It would seem
that hospital records, even where governmental hospitals are
concerned, would more logically be treated under the hearsay
exception for business entries than the official records ex-
ception.
Circumstantial Evidence
Inference contrary to direct testimony. In Williams v.
Ford,48 an action for wrongful death, evidence showed that
plaintiff's intestate, a colored man wearing blue denim, was
struck and killed by defendant's truck at 1:30 a.m. There
was evidence from plaintiff's witness that deceased had been
drinking but was not drunk. For the defendant, the only
eye-witnesses to the accident - defendant's driver, a friend
45. MCCORMICK, supra, note 5 at 611.
46. Brief of Appellants, pp. 20-25.
47. MCCORMICK, supra, note 5.
48. 233 S. C. 304, 104 S. E. 2d 378 (1958).
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driving another truck and a stranger driving an automobile -
testified that the deceased was walking in the middle of the
road toward the oncoming vehicles when the truck hit him.
At the time of the accident, the truck was attempting to pass
the car. The trial court denied a motion for directed verdict,
but after a jury verdict for plaintiff was returned, and on de-
fendant's motion, granted judgment n.o.v. In upholding this
ruling, Mr. Justice Legge said :49
The conclusion thus sought to be established here was,
under the allegations of the complaint, that the decedent,
while walking in a northerly direction on the left side
or left shoulder of the highway, facing southbound traf-
fic as required by law for pedestrians, had been negli-
gently and recklessly run down from the rear by the
defendants' truck, which was on its wrong side of the
road. In support of that conclusion the plaintiff, of neces-
sity, relied solely upon the physical evidence found on
the highway immediately or very shortly after the acci-
dent. That evidence was perfectly consistent with the
direct, uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony of the
defendants' eyewitnesses. We agree with the trial judge
that it failed to meet the probative requirements before
mentioned.
'A fact cannot be established by circumstances which
is perfectly consistent with direct, uncontradicted, and
unimpeached testimony that the fact does not exist.' 32
C. J. S. Evidence § 1039, p. 1101; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence,
Section 1189, p. 1043; Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Stewart,
190 Va. 949, 59 S. E. 2d 67, 18 A. L. R. 2d 1319; City of
Summerville v. Sellers, 94 Ga. App. 152, 94 S. E. 2d 69.
On the facts of this case, of course, the result is sound. The
suggested rule for weighing circumstantial evidence is not a
rule concerning admissibility but one concerning sufficiency
of evidence in the record to support the verdict. The myriad
situations in which circumstantial evidence is offered in liti-
gation would render futile any attempt to apply so artificial
a rule as that suggested. At best, the formula might be useful
's a device for avoiding arguments based on the scintilla rule.
Recent restatements of that rule by the Supreme Court 50
make such an approach unnecessary.
49. 233 S. C. 311, 104 S. E. 2d 382 (1958).
50. Recent cases are discussed in WHALEY, HANDBOOK OF SOUTH CARO-
LIBYA TRiAL AND APPELLATE PRAcTICE, 11 S. C. L. Q. 3A (Supp. 1959).
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Miscellaneous Rulings
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. In State v. Living-
stonr1 defendant in a murder prosecution while under arrest
was examined for a period of one month by a team of five
physicians of the State Hospital. On basis of that examina-
tion, one of the physicians testified that the defendant was
in his opinion sane. A dictum of the Supreme Court reaffirm-
ing State v. Myers5 2 found no violation of the constitutional
guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination in this pro-
cedure. In State v. Sanders58 defendant was convicted of
reckless homicide by automobile. The Court rejected conten-
tions based on self-incrimination and due process that the
result of a chemical analysis of defendant's blood taken
shortly after the accident was inadmissible. The Court found
the uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony of a police
officer showed that defendant had consented to the taking of
his blood. Incidentally, in this case the police officer per-
sonally turned over the blood sample to the laboratory tech-
nician who made the analysis, thus avoiding any problem
of tracing the blood sample.5 4
Dead Man's Statute. Chief Justice Stukes, in pointing out
in his opinion in Lisenby v. Newsom 5 that this statute is in-
applicable to transactions and conversations between the de-
ceased and third persons, indicated the attitude of the Su-
preme Court that the statute should be strictly construed : 6
The statute is to be strictly construed rather than ex-
tended by construction. Harris v. Berry, 231 S. C. 201,
98 S. E. 2d 251, and cases cited. Incidentally, it is in bad
repute with modern writers. II Wigmore, 3rd Ed., 695,
Sec. 578. McCormick, p. 142, Sec. 65. The former au-
thority refers to it as a 'crude, technical, and unjust
method of disqualifying surviving witnesses.' P. 697.
Judicial Notice. A routine application of this doctrine arose
in Elliott v. Sligh57 where the Court held unconstitutional as
special legislation a statute applicable to only two counties in
the state prohibiting the sale or possession of fireworks. The
51. 233 S. C. 400, 105 S. E. 2d 73 (1958).
52. 220 S. C. 309, 67 S. E. 2d 506, 32 A. L. R. 2d 430 (1951).
53. 234 S. C. 233, 107 S. E. 2d 457 (1959).
54. See Benton v. Pellum, 232 S. C. 26, 100 S. E. 2d 534 (1957).
55. 234 S. C. 237, 107 S. E. 2d 449 (1959).
56. 234 S. C. 237, 107 S. E. 2d 452 (1959).
57. 233 S. C. 161, 103 S. E. 2d 923 (1958).
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Supreme Court in aid of its decision judicially noticed the lo-
cation and population of cities and counties in the State, rely-
ing on the United States census figures.
Parol Evidence Rule. Charles v. B & B Theatres, Inc.
58
involved a routine application of the exception to this rule,
that where the writings are ambiguous, parol evidence is
admissible to explain their import.
Legislation
The only important statute enacted in the past legislative
session and applicable to the law of evidence is entitled "An
act to provide that certain confidential communications made
to ministers, priests or rabbis shall be privileged communi-
cations" and provides as follows :5
Ministers, Priests and Rabbis not required to disclose
certain information. - In any legal or quasi-legal trial,
hearing or proceeding before any court, commission or
committee no regular or duly ordained minister, priest
or rabbi shall be required, in giving testimony, to dis-
close any confidential communication properly entrusted
to him in his professional capacity and necessary and
proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his
office according to the usual course of practice or dis-
cipline of his church or religious body. This prohibition
shall not apply to cases where the party in whose favor
the same is made waives the rights conferred.
58. 234 S. C. 15, 106 S. E. 2d 455 (1959).
59. Act No. 196 of 1959.
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